Rational choice under uncertainty is at the same time presupposition and consequence of learning. The feedback between rationality and learning may be clarified by delving into the foundations of decision theory under uncertainty. This permits a deeper understanding of the strict correspondence between different modalities of uncertainty and different concepts of rationality and learning, which can contribute to define the scope and the shortcomings of the main approaches to the interaction between rationality and learning in economics. The author argues that only a theory of economic behavior under 'hard' uncertainty, which assumes 'designing' rationality and allows for time irreversibility, may account in a satisfactory way for strategic learning, and may therefore explain the genesis, persistence, and evolution of economic rationality. This perspective is argued to be substantially consistent with Keynes' own point of view. The author briefly illustrates this thesis in reference to the theory of liquidity preference.
Introduction
Human rationality is at the same time condition and consequence of learning, since learning is based on rationality and rationality is implemented through learning. Therefore whatever conception of rationality is proved to be unable to explain the aims and characteristics of the learning process should be considered as suspect. This is the case with 'substantive rationality', which is still the prevailing conception of rationality in economic theory. Substantive rationality implies that a rational agent never makes systematic mistakes, not only ex ante but also ex post (Vercelli, 1991) . This has the uncomfortable implication that a rational agent has no economic incentives to avoid systematic mistakes: strategic learning, which aims to avoid systematic mistakes in order to discover a strategy more profitable than that adopted so far, would be deprived of any economic value and would become unintelligible. This makes also altogether unintelligible, at least from the economic point of view, the genesis and foundations of substantive rationality. It seems therefore inescapable to conclude that substantive rationality cannot be justified in empirical terms under its own assumptions, and therefore cannot be accepted unless we believe in some sort of pre-established harmony between individual decisions and economic reality.
It is controversial whether 'Bayesian rationality', that is the conception of rationality underlying Bayesian decision theory, succeeds in overcoming the limitations of substantive rationality. I will argue in this paper that Bayesian rationality itself is unable to analyze in a satisfactory way the economic role and implications of genuine strategic learning and of the feedback between learning and rationality.
It is possible to work out more general conceptions of rationality and show that there is a strict correspondence between different notions of rationality and learning, modalities of uncertainty, and assumptions on the degree of time irreversibility of the consequences of economic decisions. This conceptual framework suggests that a thorough analysis of strategic learning requires the assumption that the decision maker has to face 'hard' uncertainty and that the consequences of her actions are to some extent irreversible. As for the rationality concept, a purely adaptive form of strategic learning is consistent with procedural rationality, introduced by Simon and somewhat developed in the last decades by a growing literature. However, in order to study the highest form of strategic learning, which will here be called 'creative', a broader concept of rationality is required, which will be called 'designing'.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the second section the nature of the feedback between rationality and learning is briefly spelled out. In the third section a classification of the main modalities of uncertainty and of the principal approaches to decision theory under uncertainty is introduced. The feedback between rationality and learning is then analyzed in reference to the principal conceptions of rationality adopted in economic theory: substantive rationality (section 4), and Bayesian rationality (section 5). In section 6 the limitations of substantive and Bayesian rationality are further analyzed in relation to time irreversibility. In section 7 two broader conceptions of rationality are discussed: procedural and creative rationality. In section 8 the correspondences between different conceptions of rationality and learning, modalities of uncertainty, and degrees of time irreversibility are synthesized in a synoptic table, and it is argued that the most general and satisfactory point of view assumes hard uncertainty, creative rationality, strategic learning and a certain degree of time irreversibility. In section 9 it is shown, with special reference to liquidity preference theory, that the most general approach to the feedback between rationality and learning is substantially consistent with Keynes's own point of view.
Rationality and learning
In this paper rationality is considered in the limited sense of behavioral rationality of the economic agent. We have to distinguish two basic aspects of behavioral rationality: cognitive rationality, which may be defined as the ability to avoid, or at least to minimize, the cognitive systematic mistakes made in the description and explanation of a certain set of phenomena, and consequently to reduce the predictive systematic mistakes about their future behavior; and pragmatic rationality which may be defined as the ability to reach a certain target avoiding systematic mistakes of a pragmatic nature. There is a clear correlation between cognitive, predictive and pragmatic systematic mistakes. The degree of approximation to the target (as defined by the objective function of the decision maker) crucially depends on the precision of predictions which depends on the degree of accuracy of the description of the relevant phenomena and on the depth of understanding of their determinant factors. In order to simplify the analysis, I will assume that the relationship between cognitive, predictive and pragmatic systematic mistakes is monotonic. Therefore the reduction of cognitive systematic mistakes implies the reduction of the pragmatic systematic mistakes. There is thus a pragmatic incentive to reduce the cognitive systematic mistakes (this assumption is very strong, but it is routinely assumed, though only implicitly, in economic theory). This is realized through structural learning which therefore assures the implementation of rationality. Without structural learning, the genesis, permanence and development of cognitive and pragmatic rationality would be unintelligible.
In order to clarify further the nexus between learning and rationality, I define as optimal decision strategy t s t+h , chosen by the decision maker (from now on DM) at time t given the information set Ω t in reference to the time horizon h, the sequence of actions from time t to time t+h which maximizes the expected utility 2 of the DM. In addition I define as t Ω t+n the 'information flow' affecting the 'stock of knowledge', that is the information set, in the time spell going from t to t+n, so that Ω t ∪ t Ω t+n = Ω t+n . For the sake of simplicity, I will assume in this paper that no loss of information is possible (for a memory failure or a breakdown in the systems of information storage, and so on) so that the flow of information cannot be negative. Therefore:
that is the stock of information, or information set, cannot shrink throughout time. On the basis of these premises, it is possible to say that, whenever ( 2 )
What I am going to say in this paper is not confined to a utilitarian point of view. However, in order to keep in touch with classical decision theory and clarify where it is necessary to part company with it, I will adopt as far as possible its approach and terminology. that is the information set at the beginning of the period turns out to be a proper subset of the information set at the end of the period, there has been effective learning in the relevant period.
The definition of learning given by ( 2 ) is very weak and is only meant to provide the lowest common factor to different meanings of learning. For our purposes it is important to distinguish between mnemonic learning, whenever the growth of knowledge is restricted to the updating of the information set without modifying the parameters of the model upon which the decision is based, and structural learning, whenever the parameters or the specification of the model are also revised.
Mnemonic learning may have a trivial economic value, because for example it helps to forecast the future values of the relevant variables (as in the Granger causality literature: see for example Vercelli, 1992) , but by definition its strategic value is nil, since any decision strategy, in the usual form of a contingent plan, depends only on the values of the parameters and the specification of the model. Therefore, mnemonic learning has no strategic value by itself, although no doubt it may be a necessary condition of strategic learning. Only structural learning may authorize a change in the decision strategy and therefore may have a strategic economic value. From now on I will call strategic learning any process of learning that involves 'structural learning' and thus is potentially relevant from the strategic point of view.
As was hinted at before, learning may have a strategic economic value because it permits the exploitation of new information in order to substitute a more profitable strategy for the existing strategy.
3 In slightly more formal terms, it is possible that, in the light of the new, larger, information set induced by strategic learning, at time t+n a new strategy is discovered whose expected value v( t+n s t+h | Ω t+n ) is higher than that of the old strategy, chosen at time t, recalculated in the light of the new information set: v( t s t+h | Ω t+n ). Therefore the value of strategic learning from t to t+n, t VL t+n , as assessed at time t+n, may be defined as the difference between the value of the optimal strategy at time t+n, in the light of the new enlarged information set, and the value of the optimal strategy chosen at time t and reassessed at time t+n:
Generally speaking, this value is not negative because the larger information set may offer new opportunities which were non-existent or unclear before. However, in order to calculate the net value of strategic learning, it is necessary to take into account the costs c l associated with learning (such as the cost for the acquisition of new information on the market). Therefore, the net value of strategic learning VL', neglecting the subscripts for simplicity, may be defined in the following way:
A positive net value of strategic learning in an uncertain and open world, is a sufficient economic motivation for implementing it. However, in order to justify a change in strategy, we have to take into account also the transition costs c i (such as the transaction costs) associated with it. Generally speaking, the new optimal strategy will be implemented only when
The reason for distinguishing ( 4 ) from ( 5 ) depends on the fact that, by assumption, the outcome of strategic learning has been defined as a permanent acquisition while the transition costs are contingent; therefore, when the ( 5 ) is not currently satisfied, it cannot be excluded that a fall in the transition costs will justify a change in strategy in the future. 4 It is important to emphasize that structural learning implies the possibility of systematic mistakes ex post (not necessarily ex ante, whenever the existing information is efficiently utilized). In the absence of systematic mistakes ex post, learning would be deprived of any strategic value and would become meaningless.
Modalities of uncertainty
Strategic learning is obviously meaningless if perfect foresight is assumed. The feedback between rationality and strategic learning presents different aspects and implications with different modalities of uncertainty. Therefore we have now to classify the main modalities of uncertainty and spell out in some detail their implications for the problem analyzed in this paper. Let us start from the received view. Orthodox decision theory distinguishes between risk, which refers to 'roulette wheel' problems when the relevant probability distributions are 'known', and uncertainty which refers to 'horse race' problems, when the relevant probability distributions are 'unknown' .
The objectivist decision theory put forward by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is considered perfectly fit for 'roulette wheel problems', while the subjectivist (or Bayesian) theory suggested by de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1954) is considered perfectly fit for dealing with 'horse race' problems. This dichotomy is unacceptable, for a host of reasons (Vercelli, 1995 and 1999a) . For our purposes it is important to stress that these two classical theories are far from being able to cover in an exhaustive way all kinds of uncertain situations. Contrary to first appearances, they share a few crucial presuppositions. First, they apply only to a 'closed world' in the sense that they are based on a complete list of possible states and consequences, and the eventuality of 'unforeseen contingencies' is completely ruled out. Second, the possible actions considered are only the simplest conceivable, being conceptualized as functions from states to consequences (Ghirardato, 1994) . Third, the above theories are applicable only to stationary processes which have persisted long enough to be known by the decision maker in their systematic probabilistic structure (Lucas, 1986) . To sum up, the classic decision theories are applicable only to what may be called a familiar world, i.e. to a world characterized by the three attributes specified above. This explains the strong analogies in the formal structure of the two theories. In particular, both assume that it is possible to represent the decision maker's beliefs in terms of a unique and additive probability distribution. In the 4 This observation could be made more rigorous by introducing the concept of option value (see Basili and Vercelli, 1998) , by making assumptions about the probability of different time evolutions of the relevant costs. However, these complications are not necessary for our purposes, at least at this stage of the argument.
5
On the relationship between the notion of 'familiar world' and the well-known notion of 'small world' introduced by Savage (1954) see Vercelli, 1999, pag. 241, n.3. rest of this paper I will call this sort of uncertainty 'soft'. However, real-world uncertainty very often cannot be expressed in such a way. Even when it is possible to represent the DM's beliefs in terms of probabilities, often this is possible in terms of a non-additive prior, or of multiple priors (i.e. of probability intervals). In the rest of this paper I will call this kind of uncertainty 'hard' .
In recent years rigorous decision theories which are able to cope with hard uncertainty have been put forward. They assume more general measures of uncertainty such as non-additive probabilities (Schmeidler, 1982 , Gilboa, 1987 , multiple probabilities (Ellsberg, 1961 , Gärdenfors and Sahlin, 1982 , Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989 , fuzzy measures (Zadeh, 1965; Ponsard, 1986) , and so on. (see Vercelli, 1999a , for a more detailed analysis).
The theories of decision under hard uncertainty have in common that the description of the states and the consequences of a decision problem is admitted to be incomplete, so that the theory can be applied to an unfamiliar world characterized by unforeseen (and sometimes unforeseeable) contingencies, non-stationary (or non-ergodic) processes, and complex actions characterized by simple correspondences (not the usual more stringent one-to-one functions) between states and consequences. For our purposes it is important to stress that soft uncertainty theories cannot account for the existence of systematic mistakes, and cannot therefore analyze the process of strategic learning. In order to go deeper into the analysis of the feedback between rationality and learning in the light of the principal competing approaches to decision theory under uncertainty, we have to recognize that the underlying conception of rationality is generally not made fully explicit in these theories. They just limit themselves to stating the decision criterion adopted on the common presupposition that a rational agent should in any case maximize her objective function in the light of one of these theories. It is therefore possible to associate with each of the decision theories considered above its own decision criterion .
The criterion of utility maximization (Max U) routinely adopted in conditions of certainty is translated into the criterion of Expected Utility maximization (Max EU) in the Morgestern-von Neumann decision theory, and into the criterion of Subjective Expected Utility maximization (Max SEU) in Bayesian decision theory. Before we consider the decision criteria for hard uncertainty, I recall that the most popular criterion in the case of complete ignorance is the precautionary criterion of the Maximin that suggests the choice of the option which has the most acceptable of the worst consequences. The principal decision criterion for situations characterized by hard uncertainty is the maximization of the Choquet 6 Expected Utility (Max CEU) which turns out to be a compromise between the criterion used in conditions of soft uncertainty (Max EU or SEU) and the criterion used in conditions of complete ignorance (Maximin). It may be proved that the higher the degree of hard uncertainty the more the CEU criterion resembles the maximin criterion, while the lower the degree of hard uncertainty the more this criterion resembles the (subjective or objective) criterion of Expected Utility maximization (Vercelli, 1999a) . Of course, in the case of hard uncertainty, it is doubtful whether the decision criterion should seek the maximization of the objective function or just a satisfactory result (according to, e.g., the criterion of satisficing suggested by Simon) and whether 6 This criterion is so called in this way because most formal decision theories under hard uncertainty are expressed in terms of 'capacities', a generalization of probabilities suggested by the French mathematician G. Choquet (1955) . He also suggested a new kind of integral which is essential for actually calculating the expected value of utility when capacities are involved (see Schmeidler, 1986, and ). the objective function should be expressed in utilitarian terms or according to a more general criterion. In any case, the meaning and implications of the use of these, and other, decision criteria differ according to the conception of rationality postulated by the theory; therefore we have now to consider them separately.
4 Substantive rationality and learning I am now in a position to show that the prevailing conception of economic rationality -substantive rationality-implies that structural learning cannot have any strategic value. This conclusion clearly emerges from the analysis of the hypotheses concerning expectations adopted in most economic models: perfect foresight or rational expectations.
In the case of perfect foresight, it is obvious that learning cannot have any economic value because there is nothing to learn which could be useful in order to discover a better strategy. In the case of rational expectations, by definition, the economic agent does not make systematic mistakes, neither ex ante nor ex post. Systematic ex ante mistakes are excluded by the assumption that the agent makes an optimal forecast conditional to the information set. Ex post mistakes are by definition non-systematic, since they are neither correlated nor auto-correlated, nor do they show any bias (see e.g. Begg, 1982) , as is implied by the assumption that the subjective probability distribution coincides with the 'objective' probability distribution. This point may be further clarified with reference to the literature which tried to give dynamic foundations to the hypothesis of rational expectations as a stable equilibrium of a learning process. We may distinguish two basic streams based on the: a) study of E-stability (Expectational stability) on the basis of contributions by Lucas (1978, section 6), DeCanio (1979) , and Evans (1983) , which ultimately (see Evans and Honkapohja, 1990) refer to the following differential equation
which describes a stylized process of learning which occurs in 'notional' time τ , inducing the progressive reduction in the gap between the perceived dynamics Θ and the effective dynamics T ( Θ ), which is a function of perceived dynamics because of the well-known auto-referentiality of the process of expectations formation. The dynamics of perceptions and expectations is a function of the systematic ex post mistakes defined by T ( Θ ) -Θ . Actual learning implies a process of convergence towards the rational expectations equilibrium. Notice that, as soon as this equilibrium is effectively reached, the systematic mistakes vanish and the process of strategic learning stops. b) study of the learning rules in real time based on the contributions by Bray (1982) , Bray and Savin (1986), Fourgeaud, Gourieroux, and Pradel (1986) , Marcet and Sargent (1989 a and b) , and Woodford (1990) . Learning rules are expressed in terms of approximation algorithms (in particular recursive least squares, and recursive ARMA estimations). Also in this case, the learning process may be expressed through a dynamic equation which is a function of the systematic ex post mistakes. For instance, the seminal model by Bray (1982) may be expressed by the following stochastic approximation algorithm:
where p t is the effective price at time t and ß t is the expectation of p t+1 which is equal by hypothesis to the average of realized prices. Also in this case, the dynamics of expectations depends exclusively on the ex post systematic mistakes, which are expressed in equation ( 7 ) by the term inside square brackets (i.e. by the deviation of the last observation from the average of past values). Marcet and Sargent (1989a) proved that the limiting behavior of ß can be analyzed by the following differential equation:
which is stable for b < 1. The right-hand side of the differential equation can be redefined by the difference T(ß) -ß, where T(ß)= a + b(ß), which expresses the ex post systematic mistake in expectations (see Sargent, 1993, n.2, p. 88) . Also in this case, the dynamic process of learning stops only if the ex post systematic mistakes are fully corrected, that is as soon as the rational expectations equilibrium is reached. The rational expectations hypothesis implies that the economic agent is not allowed to make systematic mistakes ex post: therefore strategic learning is inconceivable in any theory or model based upon the rational expectations hypothesis, and if it were conceivable it would be deprived of any economic value. On the contrary, the process of convergence towards rational expectations equilibrium, which can be correctly considered as a process of strategic learning, would imply that, while the DM is learning, she is not allowed to form her expectations on the basis of the rational expectations hypothesis. Therefore, whether the learning process converges or not towards a rational expectations equilibrium, this literature cannot be legitimately used to give plausibility to the hypothesis of rational expectations, since what is proved is above all the inconsistency between rational expectations and strategic learning. The only kind of learning really consistent with rational expectations is the trivial process, which I called 'mnemonic learning', consisting in the updating of the realizations of the relevant stochastic variables, which by hypothesis does not affect the parameters of the stochastic processes involved.
Bayesian rationality and learning
Bayesian rationality is, at first sight, completely different from substantive rationality as there is no claim whatsoever of a c orrespondence between subjective representations and objective characteristics of reality. 7 As is well-known, Bayesian decision theory conceives of rationality in purely subjective (or personalistic) terms as consistency of the DM's behavior based on the revealed coherence of her preferences and beliefs. I am not going to discuss here the plausibility of this approach from the positive point of view but only from the normative point of view.
The normative strength of Bayesian theory is generally considered very compelling. No doubt, static incoherence cannot be considered an acceptable characteristic of a rational DM. However, the same opinion is generally entertained also with reference to dynamic or intertemporal 7 Indeed this phrasing would be considered meaningless within a purist Bayesian theory. From the strictly 'operationalist' point of view of de Finetti, the word 'objective' is considered unintelligible unless it is understood as synonymous with 'inter-subjective'.
coherence. If this opinion were true, the superiority of Bayesian decision theory over conceivable alternatives would be firmly established, since it has been proved that the requirement of intertemporal coherence implies the axioms of Bayesian theory (Epstein and Le Breton, 1993) . In particular, it has been proved that the Bayesian view of learning, i.e. the conditioning of the priors to new information according to the well-known Bayes rule, is the only one consistent with intertemporal coherence. If we could establish that Bayesian conditioning were able to represent structural learning, the search for a self-consistent notion of rationality could stop here. The trouble is that in my view genuine structural learning implies intertemporal incoherence. A better theory about the world, or a structural change in the world, is likely to change DM's optimal decision strategy, thus introducing an unavoidable, and 'rational', intertemporal inconsistency.
Intertemporal inconsistency is reasonably excluded by Bayesian theory only because neither the priors, nor the structure of reality as reflected by the set of feasible actions, are assumed to change. In other words, the hidden but crucial assumption that the world is closed prevents a Bayesian analysis of genuine structural learning and of its implications. I have to explain now what I mean by ' genuine structural learning'. Bayesian theory, as distinct from substantive rationality theories, does not exclude any sort of systematic mistake and therefore of structural learning. The application of the Bayes rule to new information allows, indeed often implies, a correction of the structural parameters of the model. But this process of structural learning is confined to improving the adaptation to a given, closed and unchangeable world. This sort of structural learning is in a sense already implicit, from the very beginning, in the assumptions of the theory since the priors and the description of the option set are given, and the optimal strategy 'reveals' itself conditional to the flow of information according to Bayes rule. But no genuine novelty, or structural change, is allowed to appear in the DM's beliefs and preferences. Therefore genuine structural learning, which I am going to call 'creative learning', is excluded.
Time and irreversibility
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage theories of decision-making under uncertainty are both 'timeless', and their scope of application is not easily extended to a genuine process of learning which implies an intertemporal choice setting, since in this case many of their crucial assumptions and conclusions become implausible. For example, in order to violate the 'sure-thing principle' and the 'compound lottery axiom', each of which is necessary for a rigorous use of the expected utility approach (see Machina and Schmeidler, 1992, pp.748, 756; Segal, 1987, p.177) , it is sufficient to assume non-instantaneous learning in the sense that some delay may occur between the time a choice is made and the time the uncertainty is actually resolved.
Unfortunately, 'formal choice theory has not dealt well at all with models of dynamic choice beyond the standard "dynamic choice equals static choice of a strategy" ' (Kreps, 1988, p. 190) . The standard approach is unable, by definition, to take into account the influence that a certain choice may have on the future 'states of nature' (which is forbidden by the Savage definition of states of nature 8 ), on future uncertainty (which would imply the analysis of 'endogenous uncertainty', while 8 According to Savage, the states of nature describe the evolution of the environment and are independent of the actions of the agents. only exogenous uncertainty is considered) 9 and future choice sets (to analyze intertemporal flexibility preference which cannot even be defined in the standard approach 10 ). The intertemporal analysis of decisions under uncertainty introduces a new dimension of the utmost importance for economic analysis: the degree of irreversibility which characterizes the consequences of sequential decisions. It is irreversibility which makes uncertainty such an important issue in many fields of economics. Any kind of uncertainty, even soft uncertainty, implies unavoidable ex post mistakes even for the most rational decision maker. If these mistakes were easily remedied (promptly and at a low cost) the value of a normative theory of decision under uncertainty would be quite limited. Irreversibility implies that the consequences of mistakes have a much higher value that may be virtually boundless (in the case of catastrophes). Unfortunately, while irreversibility greatly increases the practical importance of a normative decision theory under uncertainty, it also prevents the use of standard theories: neither objectivist theories nor subjectivist theories may be satisfactorily applied to irreversible events.
It is generally agreed that the objectivist decision theories apply only to stationary processes with stable frequencies. This is not very often the case in many fields of economics which are characterized by irreversible structural changes. What is worse, it may be proved that, whenever decision-makers believe that the economic system might be non-stationary, their behavior would become non-stationary even assuming that the exogenous environment is in fact stationary (Kurz, 1991b, p.10) . Stationarity is therefore not a very plausible assumption for the analysis of economic decisions that have to face structural change and irreversibility.
The limitations of Bayesian theory are less clear as it claims to be applicable to any kind of uncertain process. But this claim is not really convincing. The main representatives of Bayesian theory admit that this approach may be applied only to exchangeable events, i. e. events the temporal order of occurrence of which does not affect the relevant probabilities. Events characterizing the realizations of an irreversible stochastic process cannot have the property of exchangeability 11 because irreversibility implies, by definition, that the order of the events is not random. Even the attempts to apply Bayesian theory to learning are not fully convincing. As was rightly observed by Kurz (1993, p.10) , 'the idea that a decision maker will set out to use information in order to learn something about probabilities is intrinsically alien to Savage's vision: preferences are the primitives 9 See Kurz, 1974. 10 See Kreps, 1988. 11 Exchangeable events are events that occur in a random sequence, such that the order of their occurrence does not affect the probabilities we are interested in. The most profound Bayesian theorists recognize that this is the fundamental notion on which Bayesian theory rests. According to Kyburg and Smokler (1963, p.12) 'until this notion was introduced by de Finetti in 1931 , the subjectivist theory of probability remained pretty much of a philosophical curiosity . . . [W] ith the introduction of the concept of . . . exchangeability . . . a way was discovered to connect the notion of subjective probability with the classical procedures of statistical inference' (see also Kreps, 1988, p.159) . This is the case because it justifies from a subjectivist point of view the usual assumption of statistical induction that the samples are 'independent and identically distributed with unknown distribution function.' Notice that it may be shown that the conditions for exchangeability are practically the same as those for ergodicity. and probabilities emerge only as consequences'. The models of Bayesian learning developed subsequently by Bayesian statistics do not go beyond trivial conditioning, via the Bayes rule, of the information-free prior. In addition, Bayesian learning involves unsolved problems of convergence and consistency even when observations are assumed to be i.i.d. or exchangeable (a good survey of these problems appears in Diaconis-Freedman, 1986 ). These basic conceptual problems are not solved by the recent attempt by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) to extend Bayesian learning to the case of non-additive probabilities. Notwithstanding these efforts, it should be recognized that 'Bayesian theory applies only to "closed universe" problems, i. e. to problems in which all potential surprises can be discounted in advance' (Binmore, 1986, p.43) .
A different way of seeing that may be based on the understanding that in the standard theories of decision under uncertainty the value of strategic learning, involving genuine or 'creative' learning, is nil. In fact, as was established before, the value of strategic learning is necessarily zero whenever complete irreversibility is postulated; the Bayesian postulate of the 'sure thing' which implies dynamic coherence (Epstein and Le Breton, 1993 ) also implies strict irreversibility of the strategy chosen conditional upon future information. This, as it were, 'axiomatic' irreversibility implies that strategic learning is without value also in Bayesian theory.
Procedural and designing rationality
As is well known, in opposition to the received substantive notion of economic rationality, H.Simon suggested a different notion, rooted in psychology and cognitive science rather than in economics, which he called procedural rationality. Is this notion of rationality able to account for strategic learning? In principle, yes, because nothing prevents its application to an open world where phenomena are likely to be to some extent irreversible. However, this notion has been generally applied in economics only to a closed world. Therefore, also in this case, structural learning is generally limited to the adaptation to a given environment. This point may be clarified by considering the nexus between procedural and substantive rationality.
The standard problem analyzed by substantive rationality is the choice of the optimum decision in a given and closed environment which is generally identified with the equilibrium of the model describing the decision problem. As we have seen, substantive rationality, if taken seriously, cannot consider whether and how the dynamics of the model outside equilibrium converges to the optimal equilibrium. In other words, structural learning triggered by the ex post awareness of having made some systematic mistakes is not considered, and cannot be properly considered in economic terms, because its value is zero. The usual, adaptive, version of procedural rationality tackles the same problem in a complementary, and in principle more general, way. The focus falls, not on the optimum equilibrium, considered as unknowable (or too expensive to be discovered) because of the well-known bounds of rationality rightly stressed by Simon himself and other supporters of procedural rationality, but on the process of learning itself and on its reasonable stopping point defined as 'satisficing'. A satisficing solution of the decision problem in principle does not coincide with the optimal solution (or equilibrium) and therefore involves residual systematic mistakes which are sufficiently small to be acceptable. This approach is able to study in a fruitful way the feedback between rationality and strategic learning in a closed world. However, this approach must be extended to the case of an open world which may change in an unforeseeable way and where the environment of the decision problem may be modified by the decision maker. I call this kind of rationality 'creative' rationality because in this case the DM is not seen just as an option taker but also as an option maker (Vercelli, 1991, chap.5) . Similarly to adaptive rationality, creative rationality may be studied exclusively from the point of view of the optimal or equilibrium structure, which is in this case different from the existing one, or it may be studied also from the point of view of the structural transition to configurations considered better than the existing one. Creative rationality may therefore be distinguished in 'utopian rationality', when only the optimal configuration is considered, or 'designing' rationality whenever also the transition processes are considered. We have to conclude that only designing rationality is fully consistent with structural learning and applies in a satisfactory way in an open non-stationary world.
8 Summary and glimpses beyond I am now in a position to summarize the results obtained so far. I argued that we have to distinguish different concepts of rationality and learning, different modalities of uncertainty, different degrees of time reversibility, and that there are strict correspondences between the above concepts, modalities and degrees. These correspondences are summarized in a Synoptic Table. -
Reading down the table the degree of generality increases. According to the point of view here advocated, designing rationality is the most comprehensive and satisfactory conception of rationality because it encompasses as special cases utopian rationality, when creative rationality is studied exclusively from the point of view of the optimal equilibrium structure, as well as adaptive rationality, when the environment is considered as given; in addition, it is applicable in cases of hard uncertainty as well as in the limiting case of soft uncertainty, and whatever degree of irreversibility is exhibited. Of course, whenever the decision problem is characterized by full reversibility or irreversibility and uncertainty is soft, it is possible to use Bayesian theory (or, for roulette-wheel problems, the Morgenstern-von Neumann theory) but their use becomes intelligible and justified only within the broader framework of designing rationality, structural learning, hard uncertainty and time irreversibility.
It is important to emphasize that the correspondences summarized in the Synoptic Table are compelling from the conceptual and methodological point of view. For example, genuine structural learning implies a certain degree of irreversibility and non-stationarity, so that it cannot be analyzed within the traditional decision theories under (soft) uncertainty. This must be kept well in mind because, reading down in the table, the awareness of the complexity of the object analyzed increases, making more and more difficult the application of rigorous methods and sophisticated formal languages. We have to resist the temptation to which many economists often succumb of applying to complex phenomena powerful formal approaches that are fit only for simple phenomena. In order to study consistently complex phenomena we have to develop, diligently but patiently, specific methods. For example, the recent advances in decision theory under hard uncertainty offer new opportunities for a rigorous analysis of structural learning and creative rationality in an open and evolutionary environment. The most comprehensive point of view on rationality and learning emerging from the arguments developed in this paper is substantially consistent with Keynes's own point of view.
The ultimate motivation declared by Keynes for his writing The General Theory was a radical structural reform of individualistic market capitalism in order to avoid its complete breakdown; in order to do so he felt that he had to introduce a radical change in economic theory and, consequently, in economic policy.
12 This is no doubt an example of deliberate use of designing rationality. However, does Keynes really attribute to economic agents, within his macroeconomic theory, the same superior notion of rationality? To some extent, yes. This is particularly clear in his analysis of liquidity preference.
In order to argue for this thesis I have first to show that Keynes's theory of liquidity preference can be taken seriously only by assuming hard uncertainty, some degree of irreversibility and a positive value for strategic learning. This does not emerge from the traditional interpretation codified by the 'neoclassical synthesis'. Liquidity preference has been traditionally interpreted, following Modigliani (1944) and Tobin (1958) , as rational behavior towards 'risk' ('soft uncertainty' in our terminology), but it has long been noticed that such an interpretation is quite misleading (Shackle, 1952; Hicks, 1974; Minsky, 1976; Chick, 1983; Jones and Ostroy, 1984; Vercelli, 1991, and 1999b) . According to Keynes's own theory, the DM, whether risk-averse or not, is aware of her ignorance, i.e. of the inability to express her beliefs in terms of a fully reliable, unique and additive probability distribution which captures all the systematic factors determining the prospective returns of financial activities, and knows that she may learn in the future about some of these factors. By holding the most liquid asset, money, she can fully exploit future strategic learning and buy profitable financial assets as soon as the increased 'weight of argument' (see Runde, 1990 Runde, , 1994 Vercelli, 2000, and 2001) will justify this choice. Liquidity preference is therefore seen by Keynes as the expression of rational behavior under uncertainty (hard uncertainty) rather than under risk (soft uncertainty). This also explains why a change in the rate of interest of one or more activities does not necessarily modify the speculative demand for money: these changes might affect the perception of uncertainty in such a way as to offset their virtual influence (inertia of investors). In particular, the attempt by the monetary authorities to reduce the interest rate through open market operations might induce an adverse upward shift of liquidity preference which frustrates the effort (the so-called 'liquidity trap').
The traditional interpretation of liquidity preference as behavior towards risk is unable to account for the Keynesian point of view, in particular for the following reasons: a) it is unable to provide a clear and sound rationale for the Keynesian distinction between precautionary demand and speculative demand for liquidity and in fact substantially reduces the second to the first; b) liquidity preference is made to depend exclusively on risk aversion and is therefore fully independent of perceived (hard) uncertainty;
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He also claimed, tongue-in-cheek, to wake up every morning with the same open-minded attitude of a little child, an attitude hardly consistent with the hypothesis of a closed world where the highest virtue is intertemporal coherence. c) this approach is unable to explain the crucial Keynesian propositions (such as the dependence on perceived uncertainty, the inertia of investor's behavior, and the liquidity trap), unless a completely ad hoc shape is assumed for the l iquidity preference curve (speculative demand for money) which is considered flat beyond a certain threshold.
The recent developments of decision theory under hard uncertainty vindicate Keynes's own version of liquidity theory: i) The precautionary demand for liquidity, occurring only when, and to the extent that, the decision maker is risk-averse (or hard uncertainty-averse), must be distinguished sharply from the speculative demand for liquidity, occurring in intertemporal decision problems characterized by hard uncertainty and the opportunity of structural learning before the subsequent decisions have to be made.
ii) The DM is aware that she ignores the characteristics of systematic factors which are relevant for the intertemporal decision problem she is facing, and that she could learn more about them in the future. In recent decision theories under hard uncertainty, the DM's awareness of hard uncertainty is reflected by the degree of non-additivity of her prior or the degree of dispersion of multiple, somewhat unreliable, priors which may be taken as a measure of the degree of perceived uncertainty (see, for example, Gilboa, 1987; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) . As perceived uncertainty increases, so does liquidity preference in the Keynesian sense. The concentration of beliefs determined by conventional behavior under hard uncertainty determines discontinuous shifts in perceived uncertainty which produce discontinuous shifts in the liquidity preference schedule.
iii) The inertia often exhibited by investors in the face of changes in the price of one or more financial activities is explained as a natural property of decision theory under hard uncertainty without resort to any ad hoc assumption (see, e.g., Simonsen and Werlang, 1991, and Dow-Werlang, 1992a and b) . The liquidity trap may also be explained without adding ad hoc assumptions. A change in policy of the monetary authorities may increase the degree of perceived uncertainty so that any attempt at reducing the rate of interest could be offset by an increase in liquidity preference.
I may conclude that the recent advances in decision theory under hard uncertainty confirm the soundness of Keynes's theory of liquidity preference and at the same time clarify its crucial dependence on hard uncertainty, the intertemporal irreversibility of most investment options (because of the illiquidity of all the assets with the sole exception of money) and a positive value of strategic learning. What are the implications for rationality? In the light of the discussion developed in the previous sections of this paper, it is possible to say that Keynes's theory of liquidity preference is inconsistent with substantive rationality which is unable to attribute any economic value to strategic learning. In particular, Keynes's theory appears to be fully inconsistent with the hypothesis of rational expectations which excludes the very existence of systematic mistakes. In addition, Bayesian rationality also appears to be inconsistent with Keynesian rationality, not only because the concept of systematic mistakes, and therefore that of strategic learning as here conceived, is meaningless within a Bayesian conceptual framework, but also because in any case the 'sure thing' axiom excludes a positive value for strategic learning.
It is unclear which notion of rationality Keynes attributes to decision makers. If we take seriously the claim advanced by Keynes himself that his theory applies to the case of perfect competition, and we take it in the usual sense, this would exclude in such a case creative rationality and would associate strategic learning only with procedural rationality: perfect competition implies that the economic agents are completely deprived of discretional power and therefore, by definition, that they are unable to 'create' new options. This may explain why Keynes de-emphasized creative rationality in The General Theory notwithstanding that his fundamental postulates (open world, hard uncertainty, positive value of strategic learning) naturally imply it. However, Keynes does not always succeed in confining himself to perfect competition, so that creative rationality emerges here and there. To limit myself to the case study of liquidity preference theory, financial innovation is sometimes evoked as a means of circumventing existing constraints (these few and scattered hints have been developed in a Keynesian spirit by Minsky: see e.g. Minsky, 1976) . Financial innovation may alter the set of options in order to establish a more favorable environment for the innovators who behave according to a simple principle of designing rationality. In any case, creative rationality underlies the Keynesian policy suggestions. For example the 'euthanasia of rentier' is conceived as a means to reduce the devastating effects of too high interest rates on the process of accumulation of capital. Structural interventions of this kind in interest rate setting would change the set of possible states by creating new equilibrium options characterized by a lower interest rate setting and a higher rate of accumulation consistent with full employment. It is therefore an example of creative rationality. However, the crucial role of creative rationality in the economic process may be better understood from a Schumpeterian point of view. Unfortunately, Schumpeter did not understand the deep link between the creative rationality of innovative entrepreneurs and hard uncertainty. This gives a further reason for working in the direction of a synthesis between the Keynesian and the Schumpeterian points of view (see Vercelli, 1991, and 1996 
